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REVERSION TO CONVERSION? THE BOARD'S
INTERPRETATION OF THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN




Recent developments concerning construction industry collective
bargaining agreements (CBAs) have once again modified pre-hire
agreement jurisprudence. Just under two decades ago, the Third Circuit
affirmed the National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB or "Board")
decision in John Deklewa & Sons, Inc.' (Deklewa), and since then, various
decisions have loosened the interpretation of the interplay between sections
8(f)2 and 9(a)3 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or "the Act").
Recently, in Central Illinois Construction,4 the Board adopted an approach
crafted by the Tenth Circuit' that discusses how an 8(f) union may convert
its status to that of a majority bargaining representative under 9(a) through
contract language alone. The decision in Central Illinois is a reversion to
the Conversion Doctrine6 and is practically a sub silentio overruling of the
* Brian A. Caufield is a field attorney with the National Labor Relations Board,
Region 22 (Newark, New Jersey). The views expressed are those of Mr. Caufield and do
not necessarily reflect the positions or polices of the United States Government, National
Labor Relations Board, its Office of the General Counsel, or Region 22.
1. 282 N.L.R.B. 1375 (1987), enforced sub nom. Int'l Ass'n of Bridge and Constr.
Workers, Local 3 v. NLRB, 843 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1988).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (2004).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2004).
4. 335 N.L.R.B. 717 (2001).
5. NLRB v. Oklahoma Installation Co., 219 F.3d 1160 (10th Cir. 2000); NLRB v.
Triple C Maint., Inc., 219 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2000).
6. The Conversion Doctrine is a term of art once used in pre-hire agreement
jurisprudence wherein the Board could convert an 8(f) pre-hire agreement into a 9(a) CBA
based on circumstantial evidence and without holding an employee election. James M.
Wilton, Changed Interpretation of Section 869 of the National Labor Relations Act: Mesa
Verde Construction Co. v. Northern California District Council of Laborers, 31 B.C. L. REV.
114, 117 (1989).
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principles in Deklewa. While the Board has neither stated that it reverted
to the Conversion Doctrine nor officially overruled Deklewa, the principles
and elements set forth in the decisions discussed infra clearly reestablish
the Conversion Doctrine and set a roadmap for unions to follow in order to
convert their 8(f) status to majority status pursuant to 9(a).
In this Article the decisions that create this roadmap will be discussed
and what is needed in CBAs for unions to later claim their bargaining
relationships are controlled by 9(a) rather than 8(f) will be identified. Prior
to discussing the decisions, an understanding of the legislative history of
8(f) agreements and their interplay with 9(a) is necessary. Concluding this
Article will be views on the effects of the new Conversion Doctrine on
construction industry unions and employers which take into consideration
the General Counsel's guidelines concerning the Agency's investigation of
these types of cases.
II. SECTIONS 8(f) AND 9(a) OF THE NLRA
A. The Legislative History of Section 8(l)
Section 8(f) of the NLRA states:
It shall not be an unfair labor practice under subsections (a) and
(b) of this section for an employer engaged primarily in the
building and construction industry to make an agreement
covering employees engaged ... in the building and construction
industry with a labor organization . . .because (1) the majority
status of such labor organization has not been established under
the provisions of section 159 of this title prior to the making of
such agreement .... 
Section 8(f) permits employers and unions in the construction industry
to enter into signed CBAs, or pre-hire agreements, before any employees
are hired and prior to an actual showing of majority support by the union.
Pre-hire agreements are necessary because the election process under
Section 9(c)8 of the NLRA is impracticable in the construction industry
where employers work in various geographical areas, "move from project
to project in a relatively short time, and rely on unions in each area to refer
employees to the job site." 9
With the passage of the Taft-Hartley Amendments' ° in 1947, the
Board began to exercise jurisdiction over construction industry disputes.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 158(f).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (2004).
9. David S. Barr & Craig Jacobson, The Enforceability of Construction Industry Pre-
Hire Agreements After Higdon, 3 INDUS. REL. L.J. 517, 518 (1979).
10. Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141(a)-(b) (2004).
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As a result, industry lobbyists began to pressure Congress to create an
exception to the NLRA that would exempt pre-hire agreements." The
lobbyists' concerns were finally heard in the late 1950s when Congress
responded to public disclosure of union corruption and anti-union
sentiment by conducting hearings on legislation-directed "union abuses of
power."' 2 The hearings were in connection with what would be adopted as
the Landrum-Griffin amendments to the NLRA. 3 To promote passage of
the amendments, 8(f) was considered a "sweetener" provision. 14  The
Senate first took up the language of 8(f) in the Kennedy-Ives bill, 5 but it
was not until the eighty-sixth Congress convened that Congress seriously
considered the language. At the beginning of the eighty-sixth Congress,
the Kennedy-Ervin bill' 6 reintroduced, inter alia, the language of 8(f);
however, the bill was considerably amended before it passed the Senate
and was referred to the House. 17 Attached to the Kennedy-Ervin bill that
went to the House was a committee report setting forth reasons for
adopting 8(f)." Among the reasons were the importance for employers to
know their labor costs before making estimates upon which bids were
based and the employers' need for an available supply of skilled
craftsmen. 19 The report went on to mention that a majority of the skilled
craftsmen in the construction industry were union members,20 and thus,
Congress deductively assumed that a union signatory to a pre-hire
11. David J. Lowe, Prehire Agreements in the Construction Industry: Empty Promises
or Enforceable Rights?, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1702, 1706 (1981). Strict application of the
NLRA to the construction industry is impracticable because of the transient workforce and
the impossibility of conducting an election of employees who are not considered a stable
workforce.
12. Debra L. Willen, Regulation of Section 8() Contract Negotiations After the NLRB's
Decision in Deklewa, 4 LAB. LAW. 797, 800 (1988).
13. Known as the Landrum-Griffin Act, the law was the first comprehensive federal
regulation of internal union affairs that sought to require unions to function democratically.
JULIus F. GETMAN & JoHN D. BLACKBURN, LABOR RELATIONS: LAW, PRACTICE AND POLICY
36 (2d ed., the Found. Press, Inc. 1998).
14. Willen, supra note 12, at 800. This "sweetener" provision (Section 8(f)) favored
labor and was retained by Congress in the final passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act.
15. S. 3974, 85th Cong. § 604 (1958). See, e.g., Willen, supra note 12, at 800 ("The
basic text of the provision [8(f)], legalizing prehire agreements in the construction industry,
passed the Senate in 1958 as part of the Kennedy-Ives Bill.").
16. S. 505, 86th Cong. § 603 (1959).
17. Willen, supra note 12, at 800. The Eisenhower administration pushed for a
narrower amendment for the construction industry, one that would have permitted the Board
to certify a union as a 9(a) representative, absent an election but instead based upon the
filing of a petition by the employer and union and upon a collective bargaining relationship.
Id. Even though the administration wanted to see the more narrow type of amendment to
the NLRA, 8(f) nevertheless prevailed.
18. Id. at 801.
19. S. REP. No. 86-187, at 2318 (1959), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. at 424.
20. Willen, supra note 12, at 801-02.
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agreement represented a majority of the employees hired by the employer.2'
B. The Express Intent Behind Section 9
Section 9 of the NLRA, the representatives and elections section of
the Act, begins with subsection (a), which states that:
[r]epresentatives designated or selected for the purposes of
collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit
appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees . . . for the purposes of
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment ....
The premise underlying section 9 is that if a substantial number of the
employees wish to be represented by a union for the purposes of collective
bargaining and the union is selected by a majority of those employees in a
secret ballot election, such a union is deemed the exclusive bargaining
representative for all the employer's employees. Section 9(c)(1) of the Act
clearly states that upon the filing of a petition by an employee, group of
employees, individual, or labor organization, "alleging that a substantial
number 23 of employees.., wish to be represented for collective bargaining
and that their employer declines to recognize their representative ... [the
Board] shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results
thereof."
24
The express intent of section 9 is to ensure that a union represents a
majority of the employees. In addition, section 9 protects employees' free
will by giving them an opportunity to cast their vote as to whether or not
they wish to be represented for the purposes of collective bargaining.
Furthermore, section 9 protects employers, as well as employees, from a
"paper" union-a union that does not represent a majority of the
employees, but merely states that it does, or one that provides falsified
records, such as forged union authorization cards, which go unchecked by
an unsuspecting employer.25 Also prevented by secret ballot election is the
danger of "top-down" organizing, a "practice by which a union gains
21. S. REP. No. 86-187, at 2318. Congress believed that pre-hire agreements could be
permitted in the construction industry because of the widespread use of hiring halls.
Congress determined that reliance on a union hiring hall for obtaining employees results in
that union representing a majority of the employees ultimately hired. Timothy Volk,
Prehire Agreements in Construction Industry: The Deklewa Decision, 9 J.L. & CoM. 243,
246 (1989).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2004) (emphasis added).
23. A "substantial number" has been interpreted to mean that at least thirty percent of
the employees express intent to be represented for the purposes of collective bargaining.
24. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1).
25. See, e.g., Volk, supra note 21, at 245.
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acceptance as bargaining representative from the employer instead of the
employees. 26
Section 9 not only advances employees' right to choose their
representation, but provides safeguards against corrupt unions taking
advantage of both employers and employees. 27 However, the full force of
the application of section 9 is not felt in the construction industry where
CBAs are governed by pre-hire agreements.
C. Distinctions and Consequences of an 8(1) or 9(a) Agreement
The difference between an 8(f) agreement and a 9(a) agreement is
great, and the consequences arising from each are distinct. Labeling a
CBA an 8(f) agreement or a 9(a) agreement has a substantial impact on the
type of bargaining relationship that exists following expiration of the CBA.
This relationship is the heart of the issue facing the interpretation of pre-
hire agreements.28
There is a presumption in the construction industry that a union and an
employer intend their relationship to be governed by 8(f).29  This
presumption has a substantial impact on the continuity of the bargaining
relationship following expiration of the CBA. The Deklewa3° decision is
pertinent to developing an understanding of the impact an 8(f) agreement
has on other sections of the Act.3 First, the Board in Deklewa stated that
an 8(f) employer is subjected to the application of section 8(a)(5) while the
CBA is in effect, meaning that the employer's unilateral repudiation of the
8(f) CBA during its term constitutes an unfair labor practice.3 2 Second, the
26. Lowe, supra note 11, at 1715.
27. This is done through the procedural safeguards established in section 9 of the Act,
specifically section 9(c), which states, inter alia, that the Board shall investigate such
petitions requesting representation and if the Board determines that such a question of
representation exists, a secret ballot election shall be directed. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1).
28. The focal point of this Article is that 8(f) agreements are converting into 9(a)
agreements without an actual showing of majority support by the signatory union and that
once the CBA is identified as a 9(a) agreement, the signatory employer is bound by section
8(a)(5) of the Act to continue bargaining with the signatory union upon expiration of the
CBA. For this reason, construction industry unions favor CBAs identified by section 9(a).
Construction industry employers, on the other hand, favor CBAs identified by section 8(f),
because the employer, upon the expiration of an 8(f) agreement, may refuse to bargain with
the signatory union and will not be subject to an 8(a)(5) failure to bargain unfair labor
practice charge.
29. Casale Indus., Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 951, 952 (1993).
30. John Deklewa & Sons, Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. 1375 (1987).
31. More specifically, Deklewa discusses what rights and obligations are afforded
signatory parties to an 8(f) agreement while the agreement is in effect and what each party is
legally permitted to do following expiration of the agreement.
32. Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1387. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2004) ("It shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer ... to refuse to bargain collectively with the
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Board noted that, "upon the contract's expiration, the signatory union will
enjoy no majority presumption and either party may repudiate the 8(f)
relationship. 33  The Board determined that it was both "reasonable and
desirable to adopt a rule that constitutes a limited application of section
8(a)(5)'s contract enforcement mechanisms by virtue of the strictly limited
9(a) representative status . . . a[n] 8(f) signatory union necessarily
possesses. 34
The notion that an 8(f) signatory employer may unilaterally repudiate
following expiration of the 8(f) agreement is the biggest distinction
between the construction industry, which relies on 8(f) agreements, and
other industries covered by the Act, which are governed by the principles
of 9(a).35 A collective bargaining relationship pursuant to 9(a) carries with
it a duty imposed on both parties to the CBA that they continue to bargain
in good faith following expiration of the CBA.36 These duties arise from
sections 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3), which make it an unfair labor practice for an
employer and union respectively to refuse to bargain collectively with each
other.
The distinction between the imposition of a duty to bargain upon the
expiration of a 9(a) agreement and the absence of a duty to bargain upon
the expiration of an 8(f) agreement, as well as how each type of agreement
applies, have given rise to recent developments in 8(f) jurisprudence.
Construction industry unions have argued that they entered into bargaining
relationships pursuant to 9(a), and therefore, a duty to bargain must be
imposed upon the employers following expiration of the CBAs. On the
representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) ....
33. Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1386.
34. Id. at 1386-87. The Board justified this rationale in a footnote, stating that
[a] rule conferring limited representational status on an 8(t) union does not
present the dangers such a rule would create outside the construction industry.
After all, an 8(f) union is not a stranger to the employees. Rather, it is usually
the initial employment referral source for most of the employees the employer
hires.
Id. at 1387 n.52.
35. The important message here is not that 9(a) principles apply, but that section 8(a)(5)
of the Act guides the bargaining relationship of parties to such a degree that upon expiration
of a CBA, solely created pursuant to 9(a) of the Act, a duty is imposed upon the signatory
employer to bargain in good faith with the signatory union. The Board in Deklewa made it
clear that "an 8(f) employer has no 8(a)(5) obligations after expiration of the agreement...
" Id. at 1388.
36. Section 8(a)(5) of the Act imposes a duty on the employer "to bargain collectively
with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) ...."
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). Section 8(b)(3) of the Act imposes a duty on the union "to bargain
collectively with an employer, provided [the union] is the representative of his employees
subject to the provisions of section 159(a) .... ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (2004). The
underlying premise of these duties is that, so long as employees are represented, subject to
the provisions of section 9(a) of the Act, a duty to bargain will be imposed on both parties.
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other hand, because there is no imposition of a duty to bargain following
expiration of an 8(f) agreement, construction industry employers argue that
they entered into bargaining relationships pursuant to 8(f), and therefore,
they may unilaterally repudiate the agreement without being subjected to
an 8(a)(5) unfair labor practice charge.37
The application of either 8(f) or 9(a) to a construction industry CBA is
certainly not a new idea. In 1971, the Board first considered the interplay
between these two sections and their impact on the bargaining relationship
between construction industry employers and unions.38 From the Board's
consideration of these two sections arose the Conversion Doctrine,
whereby an 8(f) agreement could convert into a 9(a) agreement upon a
showing that a majority of employees support the union signatory to the
CBA.39 Instability arose in the construction industry following the Board's
adoption of the Conversion Doctrine and, as a result, the Board completely
revamped its 8(f) jurisprudence with its decision in Deklewa. However, the
Board's adoption of language in recent circuit court cases has loosened the
standards set forth in Deklewa to such an extent that 8(f) jurisprudence has
reverted back to the Conversion Doctrine, and not just to the 1971
Conversion Doctrine adopted in R.J. Smith Construction Co.,4 but to a
Conversion Doctrine with a much less stringent showing of majority
requirements previously imposed on a construction industry union.41
37. This assumes that the employer no longer wishes to continue its bargaining
relationship, because the 8(f)/9(a) dichotomy does not impact the relationship otherwise. It
is only when, upon the expiration of a construction industry CBA, the employer looks to
escape any further obligations that the employer will argue that the relationship is pursuant
to section 8(f) of the Act.
38. This was the beginning of the Conversion Doctrine, whereby an 8(f) agreement
could convert into a 9(a) agreement upon the "showing that a majority of the employees
supported the union." Volk, supra note 21, at 248 (footnote omitted). See generally R.J.
Smith Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 693 (1971) (holding that the contract between the
employer and the union was not validly executed under 8(f) because at no time did the union
represent a majority of the employer's employees), enforcement denied sub nom. Local No.
150, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
39. Volk, supra note 21, at 248.
40. 191 N.L.R.B. 693 (1971).
41. It will become quite clear that the recent cases have reinterpreted Board decisions
so as to allow for a "paper" union to once again dominate the construction industry.
2006] 419
420 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 8:2
III. PRE-DEKLEWA CONVERSION AND THE RESULTING DEKLEWA DECISION
A. The Board's Adoption of the Conversion Doctrine
First developed by the Board in R.J. Smith Construction Co.42 and
Ruttmann Construction Co.,4" the Conversion Doctrine viewed an 8(f)
agreement between the construction industry employer and the union
merely as a predecessor to the eventual 9(a) agreement that would develop
as a result of a continuing bargaining relationship between the two parties.44
The 8(f) principles 45 continued to be applied under the Conversion
Doctrine; however, the Board in R.J. Smith and Ruttman allowed for an 8(f)
agreement to convert into a 9(a) agreement with the principles of 9(a)
applying in full.
46
Before an 8(f) agreement could convert, "the union would have to file
an unfair labor practice charge claiming: (1) that the prehire relationship
had converted into a full 9(a) relationship; and (2) that the employer had
committed an unfair labor practice by failing to treat it as such.,
47
Conversion could occur "automatically, at any time, without notice or
claim of majority status by either the union or the employer., 48 Once an
unfair labor practice charge was filed, the investigation began by searching
backwards from the date of filing to determine whether there was majority
support for the union in a relevant unit of employees. 49 A "relevant unit of
employees depended on the nature of the employer's work force and
whether he was [a] party to an 8(f) agreement individually or through
membership in a multi-employer association."5° The Board categorized a
42. 191 N.L.R.B. 693 (1971).
43. 191 N.L.R.B. 701 (1971).
44. Volk, supra note 21, at 248. Furthermore, "[d]uring this preliminary step there was
no presumption of majority status protecting the signatory union from challenge during the
contract's term." Id. (footnote omitted). The implication of this fact was that an employer
could repudiate an agreement at any time. Conversely, a union could also repudiate at any
time.
45. These principles included each party's right to repudiate an agreement at any time
and non-enforceability of the agreement through the duty to bargain principles set out in
sections 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3) of the Act. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 248-49 (footnote omitted).
48. Id. at 248 (footnote omitted). See, e.g., Wheeler Constr. Co., 219 N.L.R.B. 541,
542 (1975) (stating that conversion can occur immediately upon the signing of an 8(f)
agreement); Pac. Intercom Co., 255 N.L.R.B. 184, 191 (1981) (holding that conversion may
occur within a matter of days); John Deklewa & Sons, Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. 1375, 1383 (1987)
(noting the Board's previous findings regarding conversion as determined in Wheeler
Construction Co. and Pacific Intercom Co.).
49. Volk, supra note 21, at 249.
50. Id. (citing Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1379) (footnote omitted). Multi-employer
associations are commonplace in the construction industry. Volk, supra note 21, at 249
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construction industry employer's workforce into two distinct groups:
permanent and stable, or project-by-project.
An employer who employed the same group of employees over an
extended period of time, regardless of when and where the employees were
hired to complete a job, had a unit of employees considered to be
permanent and stable. 2 Conversely, an employer who hired employees
based upon its movement from job-site to job-site had a unit of employees
considered to be hired on a project-by-project basis. 3 If a workforce were
considered permanent and stable, the Board looked to the entire workforce
of the employer to determine whether the union represented a majority of
those employees.5 4 A workforce labeled project-by-project required the
Board to look at the employer's individual existing projects to determine
whether the union represented a majority of those employees." Once the
Board determined that a union represented a majority of the employer's
workforce, 9(a) attached to the bargaining relationship between the
employer and the union. 6 The permanency of conferring 9(a) status upon
the bargaining relationship depended on the category in which the Board
placed the employer's workforce. 7 That is, a union representing a
permanent and stable workforce enjoyed "9(a) status at all existing and
future jobsites,"'  whereas a union representing a project-by-project
workforce enjoyed 9(a) status on only "the individual projects at which
majority support was demonstrated. 5 9 Those unions that represented a
permanent and stable workforce truly enjoyed full 9(a) status, because the
resulting effect was that the employer was bound by the duty to bargain
pursuant to section 8(a)(5) and could not repudiate the CBA following its
n.41. They enable several employers to have the opportunity to negotiate a CBA with a
construction industry union. Id. The CBA binds all parties signatory to it and allows
smaller employers to save time and money in the process. Id. The multi-employer factor
will not be explored in this Article; however, it is wise to inquire into whether or not the
employer signatory to a construction industry contract is a member of a multi-employer
association, the reason being that there are certain doctrines the Board has established that
govern multi-employer associations. For an overview of multi-employer associations see
Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n Local 19 v. Herre Bros., 201 F.3d 231, 244-48 (3d Cir.
1999) (providing a general description of what a multi-employer association is, what the
benefits are for having membership in one, and what rules the employer must abide by
having joined the association).






57. John Deklewa & Sons, Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. 1375, 1379 (1987).
58. Id. (emphasis added).
59. Id.
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expiration.
60
The Deklewa Board discussed the "bifurcation" of construction
industry employees into workforce categories and the resulting rule as
being inconsistent with the "objectives Congress expressed in enacting
Section 8(f),, 6' but it failed to discuss the obvious struggle between
construction industry employers and the unions they relied on for a
workforce. This struggle was economic in nature. That is, pre-Deklewa
employers who knew of the dichotomy created by the Board had the option
of either picking and choosing their bargaining relationship from job-site to
job-site or establishing a bargaining relationship that would carry forward
to each of their job sites. An employer who elected to pick and choose its
bargaining relationship only had to vary its employees from job-site to job-
site, making sure it did not satisfy the test set forth by the Board for a
permanent and stable workforce. 62  Choosing a project-by-project
workforce, and therefore eluding the permanent and stable classification,
did not foster economic growth on behalf of employees. Employees
working for an employer that chose to carry a project-by-project workforce
could not rely on being rehired after the project they were immediately
working on had ended. This type of working relationship left a number of
employees wondering how long they would be employed, where, if at all,
their next position would be, and whether or not a paycheck would
continue to come their way.
Whatever the case may be for the dichotomy created by the Board and
the application of the Conversion Doctrine in the construction industry, the
Board determined that the Conversion Doctrine was full of shortcomings
and decided to review 8(f) jurisprudence in Deklewa. Ultimately, the
Board reversed itself and abandoned the Conversion Doctrine. However,
as will be seen in Part IV of this Article, the Board, with help from the
circuit courts, has now reverted back to the streamlined Conversion
Doctrine.
60. For a discussion of the duty to bargain and the co-existence of sections 8(a)(5) and
9(a), see Part II.C, infra.
61. Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1382. More specifically, the Board stated that Congress
classified the hiring in the construction industry as being on a project-by-project basis and
that the dichotomy created by the pre-Deklewa Board "seem[ed] plainly contrary to
Congress' expressed view of the industry." Id.
62. An employer's workforce was deemed to be "permanent and stable" if it employed
the same group of employees "from job site to job site over extended periods of time."
Volk, supra note 21, at 249. This choice would allow the employer to repudiate the CBA
upon expiration, because a new job site brought about a new workforce with the possibility
that the union from which the employer obtained its workforce did not represent a majority
of the employer's employees. Id.
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1. Deklewa: The Board Abandons the Conversion Doctrine
John Deklewa and Sons, Inc. (Deklewa) was a construction industry
employer engaged in the construction of commercial and industrial
buildings and was a member of the multi-employer Iron Workers Employer
Association of Western Pennsylvania, Inc. ("Association").63 In June of
1980, Deklewa became a member of the Association and entered into a
three-year agreement for the period 1982 to 1985 ("the agreement"). 64 The
terms of the agreement included "a 60-day notice of termination provision,
an exclusive hiring hall provision, and a union-security clause., 65  On
September 23, 1983, Deklewa timely withdrew from the Association and
notified the union that it would be repudiating the agreement and
withdrawing its recognition of the union.66
Litigation ensued, presenting to the Board the issue of whether
Deklewa "violated [s]ection 8(a)(5) . . . by repudiating its collective-
bargaining agreement entered into with the Union under the provisions of
Section 8(f) of the Act, and by withdrawing recognition from the Union.,
67
The Board asked the parties to "express their views on . . .whether the
Board should continue to adhere, in whole or in part, to the [then] current
body of law interpreting and applying [s]ection 8(f).' 68 More specifically,
the Board wished for the parties to focus their attention on whether
adherence to the Conversion Doctrine should continue. 69  The General
Counsel argued for adherence to the Conversion Doctrine and contended
63. Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1376.
64. Id. Prior to becoming a member of the Association, Deklewa and the Union had
previously been involved in a bargaining relationship that began in 1960 and ended in 1980
when Deklewa formally agreed to become a member of the Association. Id. During the
twenty-year period from 1960 to 1980, Deklewa "agreed to be bound by the provisions of
the contract between the Association and the Union" by "execut[ing] and adher[ing] to the
successive Association-Union collective bargaining agreements." Id. Deklewa entered into
these agreements with the Association-Union "as a separate entity and not by virtue of any
membership" in the Association. Id. However, in 1980, Deklewa decided to join the
Association and thereby continued to carry on its twenty-year bargaining relationship by
executing CBAs pursuant to its membership in the Association. The CBA relevant to the
Deklewa decision is the 1982-1985 CBA and is noted in the text for that reason.
65. Id.
66. Id. At the time of Deklewa's withdrawal and repudiation of the agreement,
Deklewa was not working on any construction projects in which it "directly employed
employees covered by" the agreement. Id. Furthermore, from the date of withdrawal and
repudiation until May 3, 1984, the date the parties stipulated to the facts in Deklewa,
Deklewa had no such employees employed by it. Id.
67. Id. at 1375.
68. Id. at 1377.
69. Id. The Board in Deklewa described the Conversion Doctrine as being one
"whereby an 8(f) relationship/agreement can 'convert' into a 9(a) relationship/agreement by
means other than a Board election or voluntary recognition." Id.
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that Deklewa violated section 8(a)(5) "by repudiating the contract and
withdrawing recognition because the Union enjoyed prior majority
status ... .,,70 Several amici 71 urged the Board to adhere to the Conversion
Doctrine, but argued for the adoption of certain rules prohibiting an 8(t)
agreement from converting into a 9(a) agreement absent a Board-certified
election or voluntary recognition.72 The AFL-CIO, its Building and Trades
Department, and the Teamsters joined in to "argue that the Board should
overrule R.J. Smith and abandon the [C]onversion [D]octrine" while at the
same time urging "the Board to adopt the position that [s]ection 8(f)
provides 'an alternative means' by which unions in the construction
industry can obtain the full status of exclusive representative within the
meaning of [s]ection 9(a) ....
Rather than make a decision on whether the CBA converted from an
8(f) pre-hire agreement to a 9(a) agreement, the Board utilized Deklewa as
a springboard to abandon the Conversion Doctrine and develop new rules
when analyzing 8(f) agreements.74 The Board stated that there were three
shortcomings to the Conversion Doctrine and the then current law
surrounding 8(f) agreements.75 Shortcomings of the Conversion Doctrine
were that it did not coincide with the legislative history behind 8(f), it did
not further the "statutory objectives of employee free choice, 76 and its
administrative and litigation difficulties frustrated the policies of the Act.77
Regarding the Conversion Doctrine not coinciding with the legislative
history of 8(f), the Board noted that Congress, with the passage of 8(f),
permitted the once illegal pre-hire agreements by including the second
70. Id. The General Counsel urged adherence to the conversion doctrine set forth in R.
J Smith Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 693 (1971) (holding that the contract was not valid
because the Union did not represent a majority of the employer's employees).
71. Amici is the plural of amicus curiae, which is Latin for "friend of the court," and is
a term used to refer to a non-party who, because of related interests in the litigation, is either
asked by the Board or petitions the Board to submit a brief on the issue(s) before the Board
in an attempt to persuade the tribunal that the position advocated by them in their brief is a
correct solution to the issue(s) before the Board. The amici arguing this position were the
ABC, the Council on Labor Law Equity, and the National Right to Work Legal Defense
Foundation. Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1377.
72. Id. Deklewa advocated this position, which, if the Board adopted it, would mean
dismissal of the complaint in its entirety. Id. That is, because adoption of this principle
would never permit an 8(f) agreement to convert into a 9(a) agreement absent either Board
certification, which had not occurred in Deklewa, or voluntary recognition, which Deklewa
withdrew, the complaint would have no legal basis.
73. Id.
74. Volk, supra note 21, at 251-52.
75. Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1379.
76. Id. at 1380.
77. Id. at 1379-80. See also Volk, supra note 21, at 253 (discussing the three
weaknesses found by the Deklewa Board within the Conversion Doctrine).
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proviso of 8(f) that preserved employee free choice.7" The Board reasoned
that the decisions that created the Conversion Doctrine, R.J. Smith and
Ruttmann, were incorrect insofar as those decisions suggested that either
party had an unfettered right to voluntarily repudiate the agreement.
79
Furthermore, the Board noted that the second proviso of 8(f) "should not
have been interpreted as also permitting unilateral anticipatory repudiation
of a collective bargaining agreement prior to the resolution of the
conversion question." 80 Instead, the second proviso could only have been
interpreted to further a method by which employees could decertify a union
or request alternative representation.8 "Therefore, granting 9(a) status to
an 8(f) agreement and barring elections during the term of the agreement,82
in spite of the second proviso, could not be consistent with congressional
intent. 83
The second shortcoming of the Conversion Doctrine was its inability
to further the statutory objective of employee free choice. Because RJ
Smith allowed for unilateral repudiation of an 8(f) agreement, at any time
and for any reason, such a rule was "not a necessary predicate for
advancement of the employee free choice principles embodied in the
second proviso" of 8(f). 84  The Board stated that it would be entirely
inconsistent to continue adhering to the holding in R.J Smith, for the mere
fact that a "proviso enacted to preserve employees' rights to choose,
change, or reject their own collective-bargaining representative can serve
78. Volk, supra note 21, at 253. See also 29 U.S.C. § 158(0 (2005) ("That any
agreement which would be invalid, but for clause (1) of this subsection, shall not be a bar to
a petition filed pursuant to section [9(c)] or [9(e)] ... .
79. Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1381.
80. Volk, supra note 21, at 254.
81. Id. (footnote omitted).
82. The contract bar doctrine operates to prevent the holding of a representational
election under section 9(c) and (e) when there exists a current and valid contract between an
employer and a union. Id. at 254 n.75. The contract must have a definite duration if it is to
serve as a bar to an election; it will then preclude petitions by either the employer or a
certified incumbent union for the entire term of the agreement. Id. at 256 n.88. This
doctrine was imposed on converted 8(f) agreements under the Conversion Doctrine set forth
in RJ Smith and Ruttmann.
83. Volk, supra note 21, at 254 (footnote omitted). In other words, the Deklewa Board
ruled that because of the inconsistency between the Conversion Doctrine and the legislative
history of 8(f), an agreement authorized by section 8(f) does not bar an election. While the
Deklewa Board ruled that an 8(f) agreement could not act as a bar to a representational
election because of the second proviso in 8(f), subsequent Board decisions have interpreted
the language in CBA's and the NLRA's statute of limitations period in such a way as to
reverse the decision in Deklewa. That is, in light of the Act's six-month statute of
limitations for instituting a charge alleging an unfair labor practice, an 8(f) CBA that
includes, voluntarily, recognition language will bar a representational election, provided the
employer does not institute an unfair labor practice charge alleging lack of majority status
within six months of execution of the 8(f) CBA.
84. Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1382.
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as a basis for an employer unilaterally to repudiate a voluntary collective-
bargaining agreement for any reason it chooses. 85 Therefore, the Board
held that 8(f) agreements would not bar the processing of valid petitions
filed pursuant to section 9(c) and (e).
In confronting the litigation difficulties of the Conversion Doctrine,
the Board noted that in order to determine whether an 8(f) agreement
converted into a 9(a) agreement, it would be required "to 'look back' any
number of years ... to determine whether the union, at any time, enjoyed
majority support. 8 6 To make such a determination, the Board utilized such
factors as "union membership rolls, . . . exclusive hiring hall referrals, or
union fringe benefit contribution records, 87 all of which were subject to the
adversary system. The Board concluded that the documentary evidence
presented to support a union's claim of majority status during conversion
litigation was often "incomplete, contradictory, or unavailable,"88 leaving
significant questions as to whether the evidentiary factors presented do
indeed justify finding the requisite majority support to confer full 9(a)
status upon an 8(f) signatory union.89 "In short, the majority status finding
that is a necessary predicate for conversion often is based on a highly
questionable factual foundation."90
After determining a need for altering the law surrounding 8(f) pre-hire
agreements, more specifically the Conversion Doctrine, the Board
considered the two positions, discussed above, offered by the parties in
response to the Board's presentation of the issue. The position offered by
Deklewa and several amici urged adherence to R.J. Smith and the adoption
of certain rules prohibiting an 8(f) agreement from converting into a 9(a)
agreement, absent a Board certified election or voluntary recognition.9
The position offered by the AFL-CIO and the Teamsters urged the Board to
overrule R.J Smith, abandon the Conversion Doctrine, and adopt a position
that would permit 8(f) to provide "alternative means" by which unions in
the construction industry could obtain the full status as an exclusive
92representative.
The Board rejected both proposed solutions and instead chose a
middle-of-the-road approach to the new principles behind pre-hire
agreements and 8(f). Rejecting Deklewa'a proposed solution, the Board
revisited the same shortcomings of the law for which it expressed the need
to overrule R.J. Smith. Indicating that accepting the first position would










mean unilateral repudiation, giving rise to "potential disruptive effects,"
inconsistencies within legislative history and intent, and a rendering of the
second proviso of 8(f) null and void, the Board rejected Deklewa's
proposal as being consistent with RJ Smith and likewise unworkable. 93
Rejecting the AFL-CIO and the Teamsters' proposed solution, the Board
noted that such a method was indeed closer to its holding, but stated that
the "alternative means" were clearly contrary to the "express congressional
mandate that an employer cannot be coerced . . . into negotiating or
adopting an 8(f) agreement., 94 The Board reasoned that
[i]f, as this alternative [means] contends, a union acquires full
9(a) status based solely on the employer's adoption of an 8(f)
agreement, the union should also acquire the full rights and
privileges of an exclusive bargaining representative. In that
event, the signatory union would enjoy a rebuttable majority
presumption upon the contract's expiration and could lawfully
seek to compel the employer, through strikes or picketing, to
negotiate and sign a successor agreement. This would be directly
contrary to the express congressional mandate .... 9'
Because the Board's then 8(f) law did not coincide with its text and
legislative history, did not advance employee free choice in the most
effective way, and entailed "evidentiary determinations that [were] inexact,
impractical, and generally insufficient to support the conclusions they
purport[ed] to demonstrate, 9 6 the Board overruled RJ Smith and set forth
several principles.97 First, 8(f) CBAs would be enforceable through 8(a)(5)
principles.98 Second, such agreements would not be subject to the contract
bar doctrine.99 Third, in processing election petitions, the appropriate unit
would be the single employer's employees covered under the agreement. 100
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1384-85. The Board relied on the Conference Report on the 1959
amendments, which states that "[niothing in [section 8(f)] is intended ... to authorize the
use of force, coercion, strikes, or picketing to compel any person to enter in such [8(f)]
agreements." Id. at 1385 n.39 (quoting 2 LEG. HIST. 934, 946).
95. Id. at 1384-85. This is the most interesting statement of the decision. The main
reason for rejecting the second position was the Board's refusal to allow an 8(f) agreement
to "convert" into a 9(a) agreement, thereby giving the 8(f) signatory union a rebuttable
majority presumption and allowing that union to force the signatory employer to bargain
with it through 8(a)(5) principles. It is the most interesting statement because, when reading
the most recent decisions regarding 8(f) agreements in conjunction with the NLRA's statute
of limitations, one sees that an automatic conversion can occur, provided that several
requirements are met. These requirements will be discussed in some detail in Part IV of this
Article.
96. Id. at 1384.
97. Id. at 1377-78.
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Finally, upon the expiration of such agreement, the signatory union would
no longer enjoy a presumption of majority status and either party would be
able to repudiate the agreement.'O Of the four principles set forth in
Deklewa, the first and fourth are the two principles that, when read in
conjunction with recent decisions, suggest that Deklewa has been
overruled, sub silentio, and the Conversion Doctrine has been given new
life.
With regard to the first principle, that 8(f) CBAs would be enforceable
through the principles of 8(a)(5), the Board adopted a position to ensure
that such agreements were executed fully during their term, thereby
prohibiting unilateral repudiation during the term of the CBA, a practice
the Board wanted to abolish as a result of the R.J. Smith decision. The
Board stated that "[w]hen parties enter into an 8(f) agreement, they will be
required, by virtue of [s]ection 8(a)(5) ... to comply with that agreement..
. . Neither employers nor unions ... will be free unilaterally to repudiate
such agreements."'' 02  The Board explained the application of [s]ection
8(a)(5) to 8(f) agreements by stating that such application would be limited
to the prohibition of unilateral repudiation of the CBA until it expires or
until the employees "vote to reject or change their representative."''0 3 It was
the chance to "provide greater stability" in the construction industry that
led the Board to declare limited application of 8(a)(5) to 8(f) agreements.'
4
Furthermore, the notion that parties would be more aware of their "rights,
privileges, and obligations" during the existence of a collective bargaining
relationship, and that changes would come in a more "orderly,
nonadversarial context," solidified the Board's reasoning behind allowing
limited application of the 8(a)(5) principles during the term of the CBA.' °5
With respect to an 8(f) signatory union not enjoying a rebuttable
majority presumption upon expiration of the 8(f) agreement, the Board
believed that Congress intended a limited linkage between section 8(a)(5)
and section 9(a), but stated that the "9(a)" status conferred upon 8(f)
signatory unions is "only coextensive with the bargaining agreement that is
the source of its exclusive representational authority.' 1 6 The Board was
101. Id. at 1377-78.
102. Id. at 1385.
103. Id. at 1387. The Board explained that such an application was not being imposed
on "unwitting employers", but rather that it was a "quid pro quo" for those employers who
chose to voluntarily enter into an 8(f) agreement. Id.
104. Id. at 1386.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1387 (emphasis added). The quotations around 9(a) are placed there to show
that the Board was not conferring actual 9(a) status upon 8(f) signatory unions; rather, it was
merely extending the principles of 9(a) in an attempt to bring about the application of
8(a)(5) to 8(f) agreements. That is, because section 8(a)(5) states that it shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain with the representatives of his
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not attempting to grant any obligations upon 8(f) signatory unions other
than a limited 9(a) conferral during the operative term of the agreement.
Thus an 8(f) signatory union would "acquire[] no other rights and
privileges of a 9(a) exclusive representative" beyond the operative term of
the contract.1 °7 Creating the link between sections 8(a)(5) and 9(a) for the
limited purpose of enforcing an 8(f) agreement was not only consistent
with the Act, the Board said, but "[was] the interpretation and application
of Section 8(f) that [gave] the most meaning and substance to that section's
text and legislative history. 10 8
IV. THE REVERSION TO CONVERSION
A. Post-Deklewa Decisions: A Roadmap to Reversion
Few scholars have considered the Conversion Doctrine, and the Board
and circuit courts continue to rely on the same few cases. Shortly after the
Deklewa decision in 1987 the Board decided J & R Tile, Inc.,'09 a case that
laid the foundation for re-emergence of the Conversion Doctrine. Cases
following J & R Tile have formulated principles that mirror the Conversion
Doctrine abolished by Deklewa. The most notable cases, and those which
will be the focus of the remaining portions of this Article, were decided
within months of each other and by the same circuit court judge."
l 0
Ultimately the Board adopted the language of the circuit court and
completed the roadmap for reverting to the Conversion Doctrine."'
The roadmap began to emerge with the Board's decision in J & R Tile.
This decision interpreted Deklewa and its progenies in such a way as to
allow a party to an 8(f) agreement to allege and prove the existence of a
9(a) agreement by one of two methods: a Board-conducted election, or
employees, subject to the provision of 9(a), the Board had to confer, in the abstract, 9(a)
status upon 8(f) signatory unions in order to bring the 8(f) agreement into compliance with
the principles of section 8(a)(5).
107. Id. "Operative term of the agreement" is intended to mean the length of the
agreement. The Board will apply section 8(a)(5) only to the extent that the parties to an 8(f)
agreement are under contract. Following expiration, no rights are granted and, absent
Board-certified election, section 8(a)(5) is not applied.
108. Id.
109. 291 N.L.R.B. 1034 (1988).
110. Tenth Circuit Senior Judge Monroe G. McKay sat by designation in the Third
Circuit and authored Sheet Metal Workers'Int'l Ass 'n v. Herre Bros., 201 F.3d 231 (3d Cir.
1999). Months later, and back on his home "court," Judge McKay authored NLRB v.
Oklahoma Installation Co., 219 F.3d 1160 (10th Cir. 2000), and NLRB v. Triple C Maint.,
219 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2000). All three cases are pivotal to the roadmap used to
ultimately revert to the Conversion Doctrine.
111. See, e.g., Staunton Fuel & Materials, 335 N.L.R.B. 717 (2001) (holding that the
contract did not establish a 9(a) relationship).
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voluntary recognition. The J & R Tile Board stated that a party may assert
its bargaining relationship as one governed by 9(a), but must affirmatively
prove such a relationship in order for it to be binding."l 2 This standard of
the Board is within the battle of the footnotes. That is, the J & R Tile
Board was relying on a footnote in Deklewa that noted that the party
asserting the existence of a 9(a) relationship must prove such a
relationship.1 13 The Board in Deklewa, however, never stated by what
means an 8(f) agreement could convert to a 9(a) agreement,1 4 but did
suggest in a subsequent footnote that a presumption of majority status
could flow from voluntary recognition "based on a clear showing of
majority support among the unit employees .... ,,I 15 In essence, the J & R
Tile Board decision, which included two members who decided Deklewa,"
16
formulated the underlying premise that an 8(f) relationship and its resulting
agreement could affirmatively be proven to have been governed by 9(a)
rather than 8(f).
The Board in J & R Tile added to its analysis by noting that post-
Deklewa Boards had stated that a 9(a) relationship could be proven "either
through a Board-conducted representation election, or a union's express
demand for, and an employer's voluntary grant of, recognition to the union
as bargaining representative based on a contemporaneous showing of union
support among a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit." ' 1 7 The
post-Deklewa Board decision that established the voluntary grant of
recognition as a method of proving the existence of a 9(a) agreement was
American Thoro-Clean,118 and its reliance on Deklewa is misconstrued.
That is, the Board in American Thoro-Clean stated that Deklewa held that a
party to an 8(f) relationship that asserts the existence of a
collective-bargaining relationship under [s]ection 9(a) of the Act
would have the burden of affirmatively proving the existence of
such a relationship, through either (1) a Board-conducted
112. J & R Tile, 291 N.L.R.B. at 1036.
113. Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1385 n.41.
114. The premise underlying Deklewa was abandonment of the Conversion Doctrine,
and the Board was very cautious to leave out any language in the text of its decision that
would permit such a conversion.
115. Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1387 n.53. Deklewa does not say anything about what
would become of a presumption of majority status, but does state that such a presumption
could be had by voluntary recognition.
116. Member Johansen agreed with the majority in both Deklewa and J & R Tile, while
Member Stephens concurred in Deklewa and was in the majority on J & R Tile. Stephens
had been elevated from Member to Chairman by the time he and Members Johansen and
Cracraft decided J & R Tile.
117. J & R Tile, 291 N.L.R.B. at 1036. The Board cited only Brannan Sand & Gravel
Co., 289 N.L.R.B. 977, 979 (1988), and Am. Thoro-Clean, 283 N.L.R.B. 1107, 1108 (1987),
to support its assertion that a 9(a) relationship could be proven by voluntary recognition.
118. 283 N.L.R.B. 1107 (1987).
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representation election or (2) a union's express demand for, and
an employer's voluntary grant of recognition to the union as
bargaining representative, based on a showing of support for the
union among a majority of the employees in an appropriate
unit. "'
The problem with American Thoro-Clean is that its analysis of
Deklewa is misplaced. That is, there is no language in Deklewa supporting
American Thoro-Clean's contention that Deklewa held that an 8(f)
bargaining relationship could be converted to a 9(a) relationship merely by
a party asserting that it should be and relying on voluntary recognition.
20
The Board in American Thoro-Clean cited pages 1384 and 1385121 of the
Deklewa decision to support the contention that developing voluntary
recognition is the method of proving the existence of a 9(a) bargaining
relationship. However, the only language supporting this contention is in
footnote fifty-three of Deklewa 22 What the Board managed to accomplish
in American Thoro-Clean was to take a footnote that was tucked away in
Deklewa and elevate it to the text of its decision. Doing so helped develop
the voluntary recognition method as a way in which a party asserting the
existence of a 9(a) bargaining relationship could prove that relationship.
The opinion in J & R Tile altered the voluntary recognition method by
requiring that the "recognition to the union as bargaining representative
[be] based on a contemporaneous showing of union support among a
majority of the employees in an appropriate unit." '23  Therefore, the
foundation upon which the voluntary recognition method rests is a three-
prong test requiring: (1) the union to expressly and unequivocally demand
recognition as the employees' 9(a) representative; (2) the employer to
expressly and unequivocally grant the requested recognition; and, (3) the
demand and recognition be based on a contemporaneous showing that the
union enjoys majority support of the employer's work force. 121
119. Id. at 1108-09 (emphasis added).
120. The only language in Deklewa that even closely resembles the second method
established in American Thoro-Clean comes from its fifty-third footnote. That footnote
states that the Board did not mean to suggest that normal rebuttable presumptions of
majority status could not "flow from voluntary recognition ... where that recognition is
based on a clear showing of majority support among the unit employees." Deklewa, 282
N.L.R.B. at 1387 n.53.
121. See Am. Thoro-Clean, 283 N.L.R.B. at 1109 n.8 ("Respondent is clearly an
employer in the construction industry and the parties signed the agreement without regard to
whether the Union had a preexisting majority.").
122. Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1387 n.53.
123. J&R Tile, 291 N.L.R.B. at 1036.
124. Id. See Goodless Elec. Co., Inc., 332 N.L.R.B. 1035 (2000), enforcement denied
285 F.3d 102 (1 st Cir. 2002) (stating the three-prong requirement to establish the existence
of a 9(a) relationship through voluntary recognition); Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n
Local 19 v. Herre Bros., Inc., 201 F.3d 231, 241 (3d Cir. 1999) (adopting the three-prong
2006]
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1. Applying "Voluntary Recognition": Watch What You Agree To!
The most recent cases dealing with the application of 9(a) to 8(f)
agreements have focused on the voluntary recognition method of proving
the existence of a 9(a) relationship. The reason for this focus is that section
9(c) of the Act governs the first method: a Board-conducted election.
125
Thus, the voluntary recognition method has been the method that needs
interpretation by the Board. If one recalls, the voluntary recognition
method of proving the existence of a 9(a) relationship had no firm textual
support other than what was in the footnote in Deklewa. Rather, the
method has developed with interpretation given to it by Boards following
Deklewa.
Three cases, Sheet Metal Workers' International Ass' Local 19 v.
Herre Bros., Inc.,' 26 NLRB v. Oklahoma Installation Co. 127 and NLRB v.
Triple C Maintenance, Inc. ,28 can be analyzed together, not for the fact that
the decisions were authored by the same judge, but for the reason that each
case deals with the application of the voluntary recognition method of
proving the existence of a 9(a) relationship. Sheet Metal Workers' sets the
tone for applying voluntary recognition, and Oklahoma Installation and
Triple C Maintenance further explain what is needed to affirmatively prove
the existence of a 9(a) relationship. Finally, the Board in Central Illinois
Construction gave credence to language used in Oklahoma Installation and
Triple C Maintenance as the approved method by which a construction
industry union, whose status as bargaining representative is governed by
8(f), can acquire the status of majority representative under 9(a).1
2 9
a. Voluntary Recognition: Prongs One and Two
Sheet Metal Workers' concentrated on the first two prongs of the
voluntary recognition method. In doing so, the Third Circuit took a strict
textualist approach by applying the literal terms of the CBA to Sheet Metal
Workers'International Ass "n Local 19 v. Herre Bros., Inc. The court noted
that the Board had held that "by signing a collective bargaining agreement
test stated in Goodless Elec.); Golden West Elec., 307 N.L.R.B. 1494, 1495 (1992) ("[T]o
establish voluntary recognition, there must be positive evidence that a union unequivocally
demanded recognition as the employees' 9(a) representative and that the employer
unequivocally accepted it as such.").
125. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (2004). See supra text accompanying notes 22-25.
126. 201 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1999).
127. 219 F.3d 1160 (10th Cir. 2000).
128. 219 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2000).
129. It is interesting to note how the Board carefully avoided the term "conversion"
when identifying the issue in Central Illinois Construction and, instead, used the term
"acquire."
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containing contractual language which unequivocally demands and grants
9(a) recognition and states that 'the Employer is satisfied that the Union
represents a majority of its eligible employees,' the employer confers 9(a)
status on the union without more."'' 30 In applying the Board law to the
terms of the CBA, the court recited the recognition clause... of the CBA
that stated:
[i]nasmuch as, the Union has submitted proof and the Employer
is satisfied that the Union represents a majority of its employees
in the bargaining unit ... the Employer recognizes the Union as
the exclusive Collective Bargaining Unit on all present and future
job sites . .. until such time as the Union loses its status .... 132
The court stated that this type of language "conclusively establishes a
9(a) relationship" for three reasons. 133 First, even though the union did not
explicitly demand recognition pursuant to 9(a) of the Act, 34 the language
expressed in the recognition clause clearly evidenced intent on behalf of the
parties to imply that the demand was pursuant to 9(a). 135  Secondly, the
language unequivocally stated that the employer recognized the union as
the exclusive bargaining representative until the union lost such status. 
1
36
Finally, the CBA stated that the union submitted proof of its majority status
and such proof was satisfactory to the employer. 37 The court went on to
state that there was "no way to read an 8(f) relationship" into the CBA, nor
was there any way to escape the conclusion that "a 9(a) relationship
governed the parties in this case."'
138
130. Sheet Metal Workers', 201 F.3d at 241 (citing Decorative Floors, Inc., 315 N.L.R.B.
188, 188 (1994)). See also MFP Fire Protection, Inc., 318 N.L.R.B. 840, 841-42 (1995)
(holding that an employer's execution of a CBA acknowledging a union has 9(a) status is
sufficient to establish such a relationship absent any other proof of majority status).
131. A recognition clause is typically one of the first few clauses in a CBA and usually
identifies the union as the exclusive bargaining agent for a majority of the employer's
employees pursuant to 9(a) of the Act.
132. Brief for Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Assoc., Local 19 at 16, Sheet Metal Workers'
Int'l Ass'n Local 19 v. Herre Bros. Inc., 201 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1999) (No. 97-7450); Record
at 136A, Sheet Metal Workers'Int'l Assoc., Local 19 (No. 97-7450).
133. Sheet Metal Workers', 201 F.3d at 242.
134. For a union to explicitly demand 9(a) status, the union must state in the recognition
clause that, for example, the union has submitted proof and the employer is satisfied that the
union represents a majority of its employees pursuant to section 9(a) of the National Labor
Relations Act. The court is stating that an explicit demand such as this would satisfy the
requirement, but because the content of the CBA in Sheet Metal Workers' established intent
and language that unequivocally implied a demand for such 9(a) status, such language
would also satisfy.
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b. Voluntary Recognition: The Contemporaneous Showing
Oklahoma Installation and Triple C Maintenance can be analyzed
together because most of the analysis in Oklahoma Installation is based on
the principles established in Triple C Maintenance. In Triple C
Maintenance, the court dealt with the issue of what proof is needed to
satisfy the third prong of the voluntary recognition method. The court
began its analysis by saying that "in order to satisfy the voluntary
recognition standard, the Board requires rigorous compliance with its first
two prongs.., however, [the Board] has interpreted the contemporaneous
showing requirement with greater latitude .. . ."139 A contemporaneous
showing may be satisfied in a number of different ways, including actual
objective proof"40 or an "'employer-conducted poll prior to initial
recognition. '"14' Additionally, a contemporaneous showing does not have
to be made by reliance on extrinsic evidence. 14 Rather, the court said, the
Board has permitted proof of the contemporaneous showing requirement by
contractual language supporting the notion that a union has made an offer
to the employer to prove its majority support and the employer has
acknowledged its satisfaction with such an offer of proof.
143
In applying past court and Board decisions, the Tenth Circuit noted
that because Triple C Maintenance recognized the Union "as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent for . . . a unit [of employees] appropriate for
bargaining within the meaning of [s]ection 9(a)' 44 and because the CBA
included language indicating the employer's recognition was predicated on
a "clear showing of majority support,' '145 the CBA met the voluntary
recognition standard for proving the existence of a 9(a) relationship without
resorting to parol evidence. The court continued its application of the CBA
to Board law by holding that "reference to the statutory section [section
9(a)] is particularly helpful in ... these types of agreements generally...
because . . .Triple C's [and other employers similarly situated] argument
that it did not have notice that § 9(a) governed its relationship with the
139. NLRB v. Triple C Maint., Inc., 219 F.3d 1147, 1153 (10th Cir. 2000).
140. See Hayman Elec., Inc., 314 N.L.R.B. 879, 886 (1994) (noting that a signed
recognition agreement satisfies the voluntary recognition standard).
141. Triple C Maint., 219 F.3d at 1153 (quoting Precision Striping, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B.
1110, 1112 n.6 (1987)).
142. Id. at 1154.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1155 (emphasis added).
145. Id. The court dealt with the Sheet Metal Workers' analysis that did not require
specific mention of 9(a) in the recognition clause by saying that "so long as the remainder of
the recognition language conclusively shows that the parties intended § 9(a) to apply," the
burden of overcoming the 8(t) presumption is met. Id. at 1155-56 n.3.
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Union rings rather hollow.' 46  The court stated that it did not see any
analytical difference between a contract stating that the union's majority
support was offered by way of union authorization cards that the employer
chose not to see, and a contract, like the CBA in Triple C Maintenance, that
states that proof of the union's majority support was offered to the
employer who accepted such proof and extended recognition to the union
based on such proof.
147
The distinction between the decision in Sheet Metal Workers' and the
decisions in Triple C Maintenance and Oklahoma Installation is the
requirement that a CBA specifically state that the relationship is pursuant to
9(a) before such 9(a) status can be conferred. Oklahoma Installation
acknowledged that the narrow difference was that its own CBA did not
contain the words "section 9(a)" while the Triple C Maintenance CBA
did.
148
2. Central Illinois Construction: The Roadmap Completes
In Central Illinois Construction149 the Board completed the so-called
"roadmap" by setting forth, once and for all, the method by which unions
can use exclusively contractual language to convert their 8(f) agreements
into 9(a) agreements. Until the Central Illinois decision, the Board had not
fully resolved the issue of how a union whose status as a bargaining
representative is governed by 8(f) may acquire, through agreement with the
employer, the status of majority bargaining representative under 9(a). 50 It
was the Central Illinois decision that provided the Board the vehicle with
which to adopt the language of the Tenth Circuit decisions. The court
ultimately held that a written agreement will establish a 9(a) relationship if
its "language unequivocally indicates that the union requested recognition
as majority representative, the employer recognized the union as majority
representative, and the employer's recognition was based on the union's
having shown, or having offered to show, an evidentiary basis of its
majority support."''
The facts of Central Illinois are simple, straightforward, and common
among construction industry employers and unions. Central Illinois
executed a successor agreement offered by the Union that included a
recognition clause identical to previous agreements. The recognition
146. Id. at 1155-56.
147. Id. at 1156.
148. NLRB v. Oklahoma Installation Co., 219 F.3d at 1165.
149. 335 N.L.R.B. 717 (2001). This case is also referred to as Staunton Fuel &
Material, Inc.
150. Id. at 717.
151. Id. (emphasis added).
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clause stated that the employer "'recognize[d] the Union as the sole and
exclusive collective bargaining agent' for all employees in the defined
unit. '12 In addition to the recognition clause, the successor agreement
included article 43, entitled "Majority Representative," which reads: "' [t]he
Contractors Party hereto recognize [the Union] as the Majority
Representative of all employees in Operating Engineers classifications
employed by them and the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of such
employees."" 5 3 Just prior to expiration of the successor agreement, Central
Illinois sent written notice of its intent "'to terminate any and all Collective
Bargaining Agreements . . . ."",'5 Upon expiration of the agreement,
Central Illinois made several unilateral changes in the terms and conditions
of employment and the Union filed charges alleging a violation of section
8(a)(5).1 5
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that article 43 and the
recognition clause established a 9(a) relationship and that the relationship
continued after the contract's expiration. 5 6 The Board reversed the ALJ's
decision that the agreement established a 9(a) agreement, stating:
"Although .. .article 43 states that the Respondent [Central Illinois]
'recognize[s] [the Union] as the Majority Representative,' it does not state
that the Respondent's recognition was based on a contemporaneous
showing, or offer by the Union to show, that the Union had majority
support."' 57  Thus, under the requirements the Board adopted from the
Tenth Circuit, the Board could not adopt the ALJ's finding that a 9(a)
relationship "was established by the contract language ....,,58
a. Points of Interest in Central Illinois Construction
The Board in Central Illinois discussed how Deklewa was the decision
that "discarded" the former Conversion Doctrine. The Board correctly
interpreted the Conversion Doctrine as one in which an 8(f) relationship
could be converted to a 9(a) relationship without an election, but did so
based on several criteria that did not necessarily reflect employee majority
support for the union. 59 The Board said that the Conversion Doctrine
allowed employees to be "locked in" to 9(a) representation by a union that
lacked majority support and that "abandoning the doctrine served the
interest of protecting employees' right to determine their own
152. Id. (citation omitted).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 717-18.
156. Id. at 718.
157. Id. at 720.
158. Id.




representation status. It certainly can be argued that by adopting the
language of the Tenth Circuit, the Board effectively revived the Conversion
Doctrine.
The Board specifically states that a
contract provision will be independently sufficient to establish a
union's 9(a) representation status where the language
unequivocally indicates that (1) the union requested recognition
as the majority or 9(a) representative of the unit employees; (2)
the employer recognized the union as the majority or 9(a)
bargaining representative; and (3) the employer's recognition was
based on the union's having shown, or having offered to show,
evidence of its majority support.
16 1
According to the Board, to obtain 9(a) status in the construction
industry, unions only need to place the above language in the recognition
clause of their agreements162 and then obtain unsuspecting and desperate
construction industry employers to execute the agreement. Upon
execution, unions must then wait at least six months before they can
affirmatively argue that their relationship with the employer is governed by
9(a). If at any time from execution to six months thereafter the employer
discovers the union did not have majority support, it may challenge the
union's 9(a) status, pursuant to section 10(b) 163 of the Act.' 64 Moreover,
"[i]f the employer fails to act within the 10(b) period, it may terminate its
bargaining obligation only by affirmatively showing that the union has lost
majority support.'
165
In addition to the six-month statute of limitations set forth in section
10(b) of the Act, precision can also act as a bar to attacking the 9(a)
representation status of a construction industry union. The Central Illinois
Board went the extra step in completing the roadmap by offering ways in
which construction industry unions can draft their contract language and
ward off attacks by signatory employers. In doing so, the Board noted that
because of its conditional nature, "a recognition provision stating that the
employer 'will' recognize the union as the majority or 9(a) bargaining
representative 'if the union presents evidence that a majority of its
employees have authorized the union to represent them in collective
160. Id. (citing John Deklewa & Sons, Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. 1375, 1386-87 n.47 (1987)).
161. Id. at 719-20 (emphasis added).
162. Id at 719 (stating that "written contract language, standing alone, could
independently establish 9(a) bargaining status").
163. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (2004). This is the Act's statute of limitations wherein it states:
"no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six
months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board..." Id
164. Cent. 1ll. Constr., 335 N.L.R.B. at 719 n.10.
165. Id. The affirmative showing must be in accordance with the Board's decision in
Levitz Furniture Co., 333 N.L.R.B. 717 (2001).
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bargaining, would not be independently sufficient to establish a 9(a)
relationship .. ,,66 The Board also made the observation that the
contractual language regarding a "union's claim of majority support" is
significant in establishing 9(a) recognition status. 67  On one hand,
contractual language that states a union "represents" a majority of unit
employees is accurate under either an 8(f) or 9(a) agreement; on the other
hand, contractual language that states a union "has the support" or "has the
authorization" of a majority to represent them is more in line with a 9(a)
relationship. 168  Finally, in a footnote speaking more about 10(b) than
anything else, the Board discussed contractual language that would enable
an employer to challenge a union's showing of majority support. In
connection with this, the Board stated that if the contract recites that the
union "offer[ed] to show" majority support, "the employer may challenge it
by establishing that the union did not, in fact, make the required showing of
majority support.'' 169  The Board "[left] open the issue of whether an
employer would be permitted to make a similar challenge within the 10(b)
period where the language.., unequivocally stated that the union did make
(as opposed to offered to make) a showing of majority support."' 70  I
suggest that in the latter situation, where the contractual language is clear
and unambiguous, the employer would be prohibited, on the basis of parol
evidence, from challenging the language.
b. New Guidelines for Investigations: Does the Evidence
Contradict Contractual Language?
On September 2, 2004, the Office of the General Counsel issued its
Regional Directors, Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers
casehandling instructions for cases in which the status of a collective-
bargaining relationship in the construction industry is at issue.' 7 ' The basis
for issuance of the memorandum was Equal Access to Justice Act litigation
that arose from an adverse court decision involving an 8(f)/9(a) dispute. In
Nova Plumbing, Inc.172 the Board applied the test set forth in Central
Illinois and found that a 9(a) relationship existed. Upon a petition for
review and cross-application for enforcement, the D.C. Circuit Court of
166. Cent. Illinois Constr., 335 N.L.R.B. at 720.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. n.14. To comply with section 10(b), the challenge must be made within six
months after the written recognition was given.
170. Id.
171. Casehandling Instructions for Cases in which the Status of a Collective-Bargaining
Relationship in the Construction Industry is in Issue, OM 04-83 (September 2, 2004),
available at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/sharedfiles/ommemo/ommemo/omO4-83.pdf.
172. 336 N.L.R.B. 633 (2001).
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Appeals (D.C. Circuit) applied the same test and denied enforcement
"where unrebutted evidence contradicted the contractual assertions."'7
"[T]he court relied on evidence that when the employer recognized the
union, the employees emphatically expressed opposition to union
representation. 1 74 The court concluded that the 8(f) presumption had not
been overcome and that while contract language and intent are "perfectly
legitimate factors"'' 75 for determining the nature of a bargaining relationship
in the construction industry, "[s]tanding alone . . . [they] cannot be
dispositive, at least where.., the record contains strong indications that the
parties had only a section 8(f) relationship.' 76
The memorandum directs that, in light of the above, investigations of
charges premised on a claim that contractual language created a 9(a)
relationship must include an "inquiry into whether there is evidence that
contradicts the contractual language."' 177 The memorandum goes on to state
that "[r]elevant evidence would include evidence that when recognition
was granted there was no representative complement of employees, or that
employees who were employed opposed union representation, or that the
union made no showing or offer to show majority support.' 78 When such
evidence is present, Regions should submit the matter to Operations
Management, Division of Advice.
V. CLOSING ADVICE
It goes without saying that before executing a construction industry
CBA, both parties should closely read the recognition clause in order to be
absolutely certain that the language contained therein represents precisely
what it says and precisely what was agreed to. A recognition clause based
solely on words, without further evidence of actual majority support, may
lead to problems in terms of the legitimacy of the union. Construction
industry employers have to be very careful to ensure that the CBA they
sign is one that is backed by legitimacy and not just the appearance of
legitimacy. 179
173. Casehandling Instructions, supra note 171, at 2 (citing Nova Plumbing, Inc., 336
N.L.R.B. 633 (2001), enforcement denied, 330 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).
174. Casehandling Instructions, supra note 171, at 2 (citing Nova Plumbing v. NLRB,
330 F.3d at 537).
175. Nova Plumbing, 330 F.3d at 537 (emphasis in original).
176. Id.
177. Casehandling Instructions, supra note 171, at 2.
178. Id.
179. I would like to thank my colleague Laura Elrashedy, whose simple request for cite
checking led to this Article being written.
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